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M.: Workmen's Compensation--Co-Employees Lability for Personal Injury

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
WORKMxN's COMPENSAT[ON-Co-EMPLOYEES LiABILIY FOR PERSONAL INJURY TO

FELLow Womam.-P was injured in the course of

daily work for his employer and received disability payments under
the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Act. This action was initiated
to obtain damages for personal injury from Ds, P's immediate supervisors, whose alleged negligence had caused his injury. Ds
moved, to dismiss the complaint contending that P had failed to state
a basis upon which relief could be granted. Ds contended that since
the employer was protected from a personal injury action by the
Workmen's Compensation Act that they, as agents of the employer,
should be considered as the employer and not as third parties,
thereby extending the employer's immunity to Ds. Held, denying
the motion to dismiss the complaint, that an employee who has received compensation under the Alaska Workmen's Compensation
Act may sue a supervisory employee for alleged negligence which
caused the injury. Where the applicable statute does not specifically
exempt a co-employee from an action for damages, he should be
considered a third party and answerable in damages to his fellow
employees even though the injured employee is entitled to compensation from the common employer. Ransom v. Haner, 174 F. Supp.
82 (Alaska Dist 1959).
The question presented by this case has been answered in various jurdistictions by divergent holdings. Each holding is rendered
slightly different from that of other jurisdictions by the language of
the statute of the particular state. Where the subject of co-employee's liability has been covered by the Workmen's Compensation
Act, [hereinafter referred to as Act] there is of course a lesser need
for interpretation, and little if any litigation has arisen on this specific question. The question as presented by the principal case is:
when the employer is covered by the Act and one of his employees
negligently injures another employee, does the immunity afforded
the employer by the Act extend to the negligent employee and render him immune from an action at law for damages by the injured
employee? Unless the employee is to be considered a third party
under the Act, he enjoys such immunity. The real question is one
of statutory interpretation since even the employer's immunity is
derived strictly from the statute. This immunity abrogates the injured party's common law right to sue for damages and replaces it
with an assurance of compensation under the Act. The principal
case states in very precise language that the majority of jurisdictions
have held a co-employee to be a third party under the Act and thus
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amenable to an action for damages for his own negligence. See, 58
Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation § 61 (1948); Annot., 106 A.L.R.
1059 (1937). However, the minority holding is supported by a considerable authority. It should be observed that compensable injuries under the various statutes do not include intentional injuries inflicted by a fellow worker or intentional self-inflicted injuries. 1
Scmm m, WOHKME.'S CoMmNsArrON § 2 (3d ed. 1941). The remedy, if any, in such cases is in an action at law.
The Alaska court cited two West Virginia cases, Makarenko v.
Scott, 182 W.Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949) and Hinkleman v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 114 W.Va. 269, 171 S.E. 538 (1933), as authority to
support the majority rule. The Hinkelman case involved an action
for damages against a doctor in the employ of a corporation covered
by the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, W.VA. CoDE
ch. 28 (Michie 1955). Plaintiff recovered compensation and then
sued the doctor for malpractice because of a subsequent aggravation
of the injury. The court interpreted the Act to include the doctor
under the employer's immunity which precluded a recovery by the
plaintiff. The Makarenko case was then cited by the Alaska court
as overruling the Hinkelman case and bringing the West Virginia
view into line with the majority holding. This would appear to be
somewhat inaccurate, for in fact, the Hinkelman case was overruled
by Tawney v. Kirkhart, 180 W.Va. 550, 44 S.E.2d 684 (1947). In
that case the court expressly overruled the Hinkelman decision and
held that only the employer was protected from common law liability by the immunity under the statute. This opinion was followed
by a very strong dissent which expressed a number of reasons to
preclude a reversal of the former rule.
At the time of the Makarenko decision, March 1, 1949, the West
Virginia Act was silent as to a co-employee's liability to his fellow
worker for a negligently caused injury. In the same year and
month, March 10, 1949, the West Virginia Legislature by an amendment specifically included a co-employee in the statutory immunity.
The amendment went into effect on July 1, 1949. W. VA. Acrs,
1949, ch. 136; W.VA. CODE. ch. 23, art. 2 § 6a (Michie 1955) provides: "The immunity from liability set out in the preceeding section
shall extend to every officer, manager, agent, representative or employee of such employer when he is acting in furtherance of the
employer's business and does not inflict an injury with deliberate intention." Apparently the legislature did not agree with the court's
interpretation and enacted the above cited amendment as a clear
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statement of legislative intent with respect to this question. In the
later case of Crawford v. Parsons, 141 W. Va. 752, 92 S.E.2d 913
(1956), the constitutionality of the new amendment was upheld
against an attack which charged that the law was arbitrary and capricious legislation, and that it deprived one of his common law
right to sue a negligent torifeasor. In light of the amendment and
the Crawford decision it would seem that an employee in West Virginia now enjoys the same immunity as his employer when the employer is covered by the Act.
Even though an employee is not held liable for his ordinary
negligence on the job under the present West Virginia law, it is not
intended that a worker's duty not to injure his co-worker be extinguished or in any way lessened. The statute contemplates only ordinary negligence, and gross, wanton or malicious actions are still
the proper subjects of an action at law for damages.
In 1 ScHNIEnR, WoRiTaMN's COMPENSATION § 3 (3d ed. 1941),
it is said that the general purpose of Workmen's Compensation
statutes is to remove the burden of industrial accidents from the employee and place such expense back in the industry as a cost of the
goods produced. A further purpose is to permit the injured employee to avoid the tangles of litigation and to acquire compensation
as rapidly as possible, as well as immediate medical attention. See
also, Mains v. HarrisCo., 119 W.Va. 730, 197 S.E. 10 (1938). The
present West Virginia law would seem to more effectively accomplish
the above stated purpose, since now a worker must look to the
statute for compensation and cannot sue his co-worker for damages.
The rule adopted by the Alaska court makes it possible, in some
cases, to charge the negligent worker with the expense of these accidents, as was done in the principal case. The present West Virginia statute presents what appears to be the more practical view
with respect to this question and in theory is contra to the holding of
the principle case.
W. E. M.
TORTS-CONCUEBENT CAusE.-Combined actions were brought
for the wrongful deaths of passengers in an airplane manufactured
by D. The widows of the deceased passengers alleged improper
construction as negligence. The trial court charged the jury that
where an injury may result from one of several causes, for only one

of which D is responsible, the burden rests with P to individuate
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